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The Right to a Public Trial in the 
Time of COVID-19 
By Stephen E. Smith* 
Abstract 
Maintaining social distance in the time of COVID-19 is a 
public health priority. A crowded courtroom is an environment 
at odds with public health needs. Accordingly, until science 
determines otherwise, it will be necessary for judges to manage 
courtroom attendance and exclude the public from trials, wholly 
or in part. Courtrooms may be closed to the public, despite the 
Sixth Amendment’s right to a public trial, when the closure is 
justified by a strong government interest and is narrowly 
tailored to further that interest. Typically, this heightened 
scrutiny is applied on a case-by-case basis and turns on a case’s 
specific circumstances. This Article proposes that in this period 
of pandemic, with indisputably strong government interests in 
public health and with few means available beyond closure to 
satisfy those interests, courtroom closures may be ordered by trial 
courts, and approved by appellate courts, almost categorically. It 
further suggests that there are alternative protections available 
that may be employed by courts to further the Sixth Amendment’s 




 * Associate Clinical Professor, Santa Clara University School of Law. 
2 77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 1 (2020) 
 
Table of Contents 
I. Introduction .............................................................................. 2 
II. A Vision of the COVID-Era Courtroom .................................. 3 
III. Sixth Amendment Scrutiny ................................................... 5 
A. The Government Interests Satisfied by a COVID  
Closure .......................................................................... 6 
1. Overriding Interests to Support Complete  
Closures ................................................................... 6 
2. “Substantial Reasons” to Support Partial  
Closures. .................................................................. 7 
B. Tailoring and Consideration of Alternatives to  
Closure .......................................................................... 9 
C. Adequate Findings to Support Closure ...................... 11 
IV. Alternative Means of Serving the Purposes of the Right to 
a Public Trial .................................................................... 11 
V. Conclusion .............................................................................. 15 
 
I. Introduction 
In 2020, with the novel coronavirus producing both illness 
and government responses intended to reduce its spread, courts 
nationwide have issued orders continuing criminal trials, 
essentially closing the courts.1 Even the Supreme Court 
postponed oral arguments for the current term.2 These orders 
largely deferred trials of all kinds. No responsible judge wants 
to bring people together to empanel a jury when that would risk 
exposing prospective jurors and court staff to the virus. 
Should courts determine, however, with the passage of 
time, that a jury may be convened to try the backlog of cases 
before it, the question remains, how populated should the 
 
 1. See, e.g., U.S. DIST. COURT FOR THE N. DIST. OF ILL., SECOND AMENDED 
GENERAL ORDER 20-0012 (Mar. 30, 2020), https://perma.cc/89HN-4SLG (PDF); 
SUPERIOR COURT OF CAL., CTY. OF S.F., APRIL 13, 2020 GENERAL ORDER RE: 
IMPLEMENTATION OF EMERGENCY RELIEF (Apr. 13, 2020), https://perma.cc
/NK5Q-FBSQ (PDF). 
 2. See COVID-19 Announcements, SUP. CT OF THE U.S., https://perma.cc
/X3T2-GZE4 (last visited May 19, 2020) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). 
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courtroom be? With the need for pandemic-mandated social 
distancing likely to persist for months, if not years, some sort of 
accommodations will have to be made. Juries will need to be 
empaneled, eventually. But will jurors be able to sit a few inches 
from one another, per previous common practice? Or will they 
have to be spaced throughout the courtroom, to prevent the 
transmission of the virus through droplets or aerosolized 
material? 
Beyond the jury itself, what about the courtroom audience? 
It seems to be a given that they must, at least, be kept apart.3 
But public health needs might recommend excluding them 
altogether. The fewer attendees at a trial, the fewer 
opportunities for the virus to spread. 
The exclusion of spectators presents a constitutional 
problem. The Sixth Amendment guarantees to criminal 
defendants the right to a public trial.4 “Our country’s public trial 
guarantee reflects the founders’ wisdom of the need to cast 
sunlight—the best of disinfectants—on criminal trials.”5 The 
right is implicated if spectators are excluded from a criminal 
trial, absent waiver of the right by the defendant.6 This Article 
addresses the Sixth Amendment implications of courtroom 
management options that require closure. It also proposes that 
closures ordered in response to the COVID-19 crisis should pass 
constitutional muster almost categorically, rather than as 
determined on a case by case basis. Finally, it reviews 
procedural tools that may help further the values of the right to 
a public trial, even in a closure situation. 
II. A Vision of the COVID-Era Courtroom 
A COVID courtroom is likely one without any members of 
the public, but could also be one with some select members of 
the public admitted. The essential participants in a criminal 
 
 3. See Social Distancing: Keep Your Distance to Slow the Spread, CTRS. 
FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://perma.cc/53HS-9H7Z (last 
visited May 19, 2020) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 4. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 5. State v. Silvernail, 831 N.W.2d 594, 607 (Minn. 2013) (Anderson, J., 
dissenting). 
 6. See Levine v. United States, 362 U.S. 610, 619–20 (1960) (indicating 
that a defendant may waive his right to a public trial). 
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trial include the defendant and counsel, the judge, the 
prosecutor, and the jury. A court reporter is common, but could 
conceivably be replaced by a recording device. A bailiff or 
courtroom clerk is customary. In some courtrooms, these diverse 
players may be kept apart by the six feet prescribed by the 
Centers for Disease Control & Prevention (CDC) and other 
agencies.7 Many state and federal courtrooms, however, would 
have difficulty positioning twelve jurors six feet apart, and 
would not be able to accommodate trial spectators beyond the 
essential participants while honoring social distancing 
protocols. 
Even greater practical problems may be faced by judges and 
courtroom staff trying to manage large venire panels from which 
juries are chosen in individual cases. These can consist of many 
dozens, even hundreds of potential jurors, who have to be 
shepherded to courtrooms for voir dire.8 Indeed, many 
courtroom closure cases arise in the context of voir dire 
proceedings and the management of prospective jurors in a 
courtroom while a jury is being selected.9 While these 
complexities may be practically overwhelming, they are not 
necessarily constitutional in nature.  
Accordingly, this Article is addressed to the specific image 
of the COVID courtroom during trial—one featuring essential 
participants, and either entirely without spectators or with a 
limited number of them. Presuming that no spectators may 
attend trial, trials convened with only essential participants 
would be considered closed for Sixth Amendment purposes.10 
Trials held with only some spectators, excluding those beyond 
some permitted number, would be considered partially closed 
under common Sixth Amendment jurisprudence developed in 
the lower courts.11 In case of either a closure or partial closure, 
 
 7. See CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note 3. 
 8. See, e.g., Berghuis v. Smith, 559 U.S. 314, 319 (2010) (noting a venire 
panel of 60–100 potential jurors). 
 9. See, e.g., Presley v. Georgia, 558 U.S. 209, 210 (2010); United States 
v. Gupta, 699 F.3d 682, 684 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 10. Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 42 (1984) (treating as closed, for Sixth 
Amendment purposes, a courtroom “closed to all persons other than witnesses, 
court personnel, the parties, and the lawyers”). 
 11. See infra notes 28–29 and accompanying text. 
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some form of heightened constitutional scrutiny would be 
applied to determine the propriety of the closure.12  
III. Sixth Amendment Scrutiny 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides, in part, that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the 
accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial.”13 The 
right to a public trial is not absolute, however.14 Some closures 
are permissible. In Waller v. Georgia,15 the Supreme Court set 
forth the test trial courts should apply to determine whether a 
courtroom closure is appropriate. 
The Court prescribed a four-part test to determine whether 
a closure complies with the Sixth Amendment: 
[1] the party seeking to close the [proceeding] must advance 
an overriding interest that is likely to be prejudiced, [2] the 
closure must be no broader than necessary to protect that 
interest, [3] the trial court must consider reasonable 
alternatives to closing the proceeding, and [4] it must make 
findings adequate to support the closure.16 
Waller’s test is in the nature of strict scrutiny.17 While 
Waller requires that the government interest pursued through 
a courtroom closure be an “overriding” one,18 rather than 
employing the commonly used strict scrutiny language of a 
“compelling” interest,19 it is indistinguishable. The strict 
scrutiny of Waller is an unusual kind, however—one steeped in 
 
 12. See infra note 30 and accompanying text. 
 13. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 14. See Waller, 467 U.S. at 45. 
 15. 467 U.S. 39 (1984). 
 16. Id. at 48 (citing Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 
511–12 (1984) (establishing a test for a courtroom closure case arising under 
the First Amendment)). 
 17. See Commonwealth v. Chism, 65 N.E.3d 1171, 1178 (Mass. 2017) 
(referring to the “strict scrutiny test articulated in Waller”). Cf. In re Reporters 
Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 773 F.2d 1325, 1354 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (citing 
Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 509 (1984) (observing 
that “[t]he Supreme Court has most recently spoken as if closure orders must 
meet the test of strict scrutiny”)). 
 18. Waller, 467 U.S. at 48. 
 19. See, e.g., Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988) (setting forth strict 
scrutiny test in the First Amendment context). 
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the practicalities of courtroom management. Strict scrutiny has 
been famously described as “‘strict’ in theory and fatal in fact.”20 
It is not so when courtroom management is at stake.21 
A. The Government Interests Satisfied by a COVID Closure 
1. Overriding Interests to Support Complete Closures 
Interests that courts have found “overriding” for purposes 
of the Waller test are typically responsive to the safety, privacy, 
and emotional needs of particular courtroom participants. 
Perhaps unremarkably, “[t]he safety of law enforcement officers 
‘unquestionably’ may constitute an overriding interest.”22 
Similarly, those officers’ privacy (which may also implicate their 
safety) qualifies: “[T]he State has an ‘overriding interest’ in 
protecting the identity of its undercover officers.”23 Courts have 
also frequently justified closures to protect the emotional 
well-being of child witnesses.24 
Protecting public health is indisputably an “overriding” 
interest.25 Protecting the public from unnecessarily spreading a 
potentially fatal virus is not only a purpose the government may 
pursue; it is one it has an obligation to. The values served by the 
right to a public trial are important ones, but are, in almost all 
cases, hypothetical. There is little danger, in the ordinary case, 
 
 20. Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term—Foreword: In 
Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal 
Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972). 
 21. Cf. Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical 
Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 819– 20 
(2006) (noting that judicial actions reviewed under strict scrutiny are upheld 
at a rate of fifty-eight percent). 
 22. Moss v. Colvin, 845 F.3d 516, 520 (2d Cir. 2017). 
 23. Rodriguez v. Miller, 537 F.3d 102, 110 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 24. See, e.g., Bowers v. Michigan, No. 16-2325, 2017 WL 1531958, at *1 
(6th Cir. Apr. 28, 2017) (“[T]he victim was twelve years old when she testified, 
her testimony was sensitive, and the closure was done to protect the victim 
from embarrassment and shame.”). 
 25. See Mead v. Holder, 766 F. Supp. 2d 16, 43 (D.D.C. 2011) (“[T]he 
Government clearly has a compelling interest in safeguarding the public 
health by regulating the health care and insurance markets.”); Legatus v. 
Sebelius, 901 F. Supp. 2d 980, 995 (E.D. Mich. 2012) (“The court has no doubt 
that every level of Government has an interest in promoting public health as 
a general matter . . . .”). 
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of wrongdoing by the trial’s participants that requires the 
watchful eye of the public to stamp out. The danger to the health 
of the trial’s essential participants, any would-be spectator, and 
the people they encounter after leaving the courtroom, on the 
other hand, is considerably more acute. 
There are cases indicating that closures justified by nothing 
more than tight quarters—a lack of room for both jury 
candidates and the public—lack an overriding interest.26 But 
those are very different circumstances. In the ordinary 
course — pre-COVID days—accommodations may be made for 
substantial numbers of people: a shifted table here, an extra 
seat there. Social distancing requires strict limits on the number 
of people in the courtroom. If the justification offered is one of 
convenience and relatively straightforward logistics, it should 
not be considered “overriding.” That is not the case in the 
COVID courtroom. Its spacing requirements arise from vital 
public health needs. 
2. “Substantial Reasons” to Support Partial Closures. 
The Waller test has been applied not only to complete 
closures of trial proceedings, but also to partial closures of court 
proceedings. As the terms have developed, a complete courtroom 
closure is one in which all non-participating individuals are 
excluded from the courtroom, for all of a proceeding. The 
“proceeding” may be a granular one—a motion hearing, for 
instance—it need not be an entire trial.27 A partial closure, on 
the other hand, is one in which certain individuals are 
excluded,28 or people are generally excluded, but only for a very 
specific portion—the testimony of a particular witness, for 
instance.29  
The Supreme Court has never differentiated between, nor 
used the terms, partial and complete closures. The terminology 
 
 26. See Gibbons v. Savage, 555 F.3d 112, 117 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding that, 
under Waller, insufficient space because of the size of the venire and the risk 
of tainting the jury pool are not “compelling reasons” for closure). 
 27. See, e.g., Presley v. Georgia, 558 U.S. 209, 210 (2010) (defining the 
closure of voir dire as a proceeding). 
 28. See United States v. Laureano-Perez, 797 F.3d 45, 77–79 (1st Cir. 
2015). 
 29. See State v. Turrietta, 308 P.3d 964, 967 (N.M. 2013). 
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has taken hold in the lower courts, however, as a way of 
distinguishing between closures that require close attention, 
and those that are perhaps subject to more cursory analysis. 
Most courts have applied a slightly different version of the 
Waller test to partial closures.30 When “partial” closures are at 
issue, they have diluted Waller’s “overriding” interest to require 
only a “substantial” interest.31  This makes clear the lower 
courts’ understanding that Waller applies strict scrutiny. These 
courts have fashioned a form of intermediate scrutiny at the 
interest phase of the tiered scrutiny approach.32  
In practice, the “substantial reasons” courts have approved 
as justifying partial courtroom closures are quite similar to the 
“overriding interests” that have supported valid complete 
closures.33 The same safety and emotional well-being interests 
that are invoked as “overriding interests” have been recited as 
“substantial reasons.”34 
Despite this relatively long discursion into the distinction 
between a complete closure of a COVID courtroom and a partial 
one that might permit the attendance of some spectators, the 
result should be the same. The public health reasons that justify 
a total courtroom closure apply with even more force in a partial 
closure situation, where Sixth Amendment concerns for fairness 
and “sunlight” are less acute.35 
In closure cases of all stripes, the government interest in 
keeping people apart from one another in pursuit of reducing 
 
 30. See United States v. Simmons, 797 F.3d 409, 413–14 (6th Cir. 2015) 
(“Nearly all federal courts of appeals . . . have distinguished between the total 
closure of proceedings and situations in which a courtroom is only partially 
closed to certain spectators.”). 
 31. See, e.g., Woods v. Kuhlmann, 977 F.2d 74, 76 (2d Cir. 1992) (applying 
the “substantial reason” test). But see Turrietta, 308 P.3d at 967 (holding 
Waller’s “overriding interest” factor applies in partial closures excluding only 
some courtroom spectators). 
 32. See Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 
2375 (2018) (describing intermediate scrutiny as requiring a substantial 
interest). 
 33. See Woods, 977 F.2d at 77 (finding both overriding interest and 
substantial reason in closing for “protection of a witness who claims to be 
frightened as a result of perceived threats”). 
 34. See United States v. Osborne, 68 F.3d 94, 99 (5th Cir. 1995) (“The 
protection of a minor from emotional harm is a substantial enough reason to 
defend a limited closing of the proceedings.”). 
 35. See id. 
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infections from the coronavirus is sufficient to justify the order. 
There should be little more demanded of a judge managing a 
COVID courtroom—the closure occurred in response to a 
government interest of the first order. 
B. Tailoring and Consideration of Alternatives to Closure 
The next two factors of the Waller test are interrelated. The 
second factor calls for the closure to be “no broader than 
necessary.”36 The third requires that the court “must consider 
reasonable alternatives” to closing the courtroom.37 Together, 
they call upon the judge to craft a narrowly tailored closure, and 
to consider alternatives to closure. The tailoring aspect of strict 
scrutiny asks whether the means chosen to protect the 
government interest at issue was the necessary one, or whether 
other choices could have been made that would better protect 
the constitutional right at issue.38   
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Presley v. Georgia39 
provides a helpful example of how a judge may tailor courtroom 
management to protect the interest in a public trial. In Presley, 
the trial judge had closed the courtroom to the public because 
there just wasn’t “space,” and because he worried that the 
defendant’s uncle, the lone spectator attending the trial, might 
make prejudicial remarks that the close-quarters jurors might 
hear.40 
The Court indicated that it could easily hypothesize many 
alternatives to closure: “some possibilities include reserving one 
or more rows for the public; dividing the jury venire panel to 
reduce courtroom congestion; or instructing prospective jurors 
not to engage or interact with audience members.”41 
 
 36. Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 48 (1984). 
 37. Id. 
 38. See, e.g., United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., 529 U.S. 803, 815 
(2000) (explaining that a government action is not narrowly tailored if there 
are less rights-restrictive alternatives available). 
 39. 558 U.S. 209 (2010). 
 40. See id. at 210–11. 
 41. Id. at 215; see also People v. Evans, 69 N.E.3d 322, 326 (Ill. App. Ct. 
2016) (“[W]e can conceive reasonable alternatives—many of which are based 
in common sense.”). 
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If there are alternatives to closure, a trial court is expected 
to resort to them first, not last. If there are other courtroom 
management techniques, like those described in Presley, they 
should be used in lieu of closure.  
A COVID closure is categorically “no broader than 
necessary,” and is the only “reasonable” response to the 
government interest in public health. A courtroom is a physical 
space, with physical limits. It is measurable in square feet. If a 
group of people wants to honor the social distancing regimen 
while occupying that space, it can do so only in certain 
numbers.42 This requires the exclusion of people beyond those 
numbers.  
Alternatives are imaginable, but they are not reasonable 
ones. Entrants into the courtroom could conceivably enter in 
great numbers should they be in “hazmat”-style suits. Few 
people have those. Courts are not equipped to dispense them. 
Additionally, a court could administer testing, perhaps for the 
disease, perhaps for antibodies. Aside from the invasion of 
privacy this might induce, here, too, courts are not equipped. 
They are not situated to engage in medical testing. Given the 
practical restraints on a judge’s ability to reduce the possibility 
of disease being spread in her courtroom, closure, complete or 
partial, is the only tool at her disposal. 
While there are no reasonable alternatives to closure in the 
COVID courtroom, there is one subsidiary issue that will 
require trial judge attention. When determining who should be 
excluded, should there be room for any of the public, priority 
should be given to people associated with the defendant. While 
it is dicta, the Supreme Court has indicated that the accused is 
entitled to have friends and family members present in the 
courtroom.43  
 
 42. Those numbers may change as our understanding changes. Today’s 
six feet may be tomorrow’s two, or twenty. 
 43. See In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 271–72 (1948) (“[W]ithout exception all 
courts have held that an accused is at the very least entitled to have his 
friends, relatives and counsel present . . . .”); see also United States v. Rivera, 
682 F.3d 1223, 1230 (9th Cir. 2012). 
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C. Adequate Findings to Support Closure 
Waller’s final demand is that a trial court “make findings 
adequate to support the closure.”44 These findings must be 
“specific enough that a reviewing court can determine whether 
the closure order was properly entered.”45 These findings do not 
require a particular form of opinion or order.46  
In the context of a COVID closure, this factor, too, is easily 
satisfied. The public health crisis the world is presently 
enduring may be judicially noticed.47 Once the court takes notice 
of the public health crisis, resulting findings flow therefrom, 
naturally. Acting to reduce the spread of the virus is an 
indisputable “overriding interest.” Maintaining social distance 
or separation is the necessary means of furthering that interest, 
and no reasonable alternatives are available. 
IV. Alternative Means of Serving the Purposes of the Right to a 
Public Trial 
While the application of the Waller test in the COVID era 
demonstrates that closures to protect public health comply with 
the requirements of the Sixth Amendment, there are additional 
ways to assure that the values and purposes of the right to a 
public trial are honored. A court ordering a Waller-compliant 
closure may nonetheless provide additional procedural 
protections for defendants subjected to closed proceedings. One 
of these is already in place—trial transcripts. The other is video 
recording of trial proceedings. 
The Sixth Amendment’s right to a public trial exists to  (1) 
“ensur[e] that judge and prosecutor carry out their duties 
 
 44. Waller, 467 U.S. at 48. 
 45. Presley, 558 U.S. at 215 (quoting Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior 
Court, 464 U.S. 501, 510 (1984)). 
 46. See Bell v. Jarvis, 236 F.3d 149, 172 (4th Cir. 2000) (“[T]he Waller 
Court prescribed no particular format to which a trial judge must adhere to 
satisfy the findings requirement.”). 
 47. See FED. R. EVID. 201. The COVID crisis and social distancing 
protocols are “generally known within [any] trial court’s territorial 
jurisdiction.” See NLRB v. Ford Motor Co., 114 F.2d 905, 911 (6th Cir. 1940) 
(taking judicial notice of social conditions and noting that “[t]he court may not 
close its eyes to what was referred to at the time by the then Governor of 
Michigan, as ‘the greatest industrial conflict of all times’”). 
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responsibly,” (2) “encourag[e] witnesses to come forward,” and 
(3) “discourag[e] perjury.”48 “[T]he guarantee has always been 
recognized as a safeguard against any attempt to employ our 
courts as instruments of persecution.”49 But the right was 
conceived in a different time, one without the ability to 
memorialize the details of a trial—stenographically, visually, or 
aurally. Today, verbatim transcripts, audio recordings, and 
video may provide the needed “sunlight” shed on trial 
proceedings in a way that did not exist centuries ago. Because 
of the availability of these many ameliorative processes, the 
right to a public trial should probably be policed less rigorously 
as a general matter, but should certainly be in this time of 
emergency. Alternate means of publicizing a trial’s contents 
may be constitutionally adequate, while benefitting our 
present-day public health needs. 
The first way to accommodate the concerns of the right to a 
public trial is by ensuring the availability of transcripts (or, 
perhaps, audiovisual recordings of some sort). To be sure, the 
court has never said that the Sixth Amendment’s protection is 
adequately safeguarded by transcripts, and transcripts were 
surely available in Waller and Presley, cases in which the Court 
held that the right had been violated. Nonetheless, a transcript 
or other memorialization of trial proceedings necessarily 
contributes to the good government goals of the right to a public 
trial.50 
Moreover, the Court has indicated that transcripts may be 
constitutionally satisfactory in the First Amendment context of 
the right of public access to a trial. The Court’s jurisprudence on 
that right gave birth to the Waller test. Indeed, Waller’s 
requirement of an “overriding interest” and narrow tailoring 
 
 48. Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 46 (1984); see also Jocelyn Simonson, 
The Criminal Court Audience in A Post-Trial World, 127 HARV. L. REV. 2173, 
2177 (2014) (“[T]here is power in the act of observation: audiences affect the 
behavior of government actors inside the courtroom, helping to define the 
proceedings through their presence.”). 
 49. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. at 270. 
 50. See Ayala v. Speckard, 131 F.3d 62, 72 (2d Cir. 1997) (en banc) (noting 
availability of transcript as a consideration in evaluating the validity of a 
courtroom closure). 
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was taken verbatim from a First Amendment press access case: 
Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court.51 
Besides delivering its test to Waller, the Court also 
indicated that transcripts were a means of providing 
constitutionally required public access. It explained that “the 
constitutional values sought to be protected by holding open 
proceedings may be satisfied later by making a transcript of the 
closed proceedings available within a reasonable time.”52  
The Court had previously set forth a similar assessment of 
the power of a transcript, noting that when a hearing transcript 
was made available after the fact, “[t]he press and the public 
then had a full opportunity to scrutinize the suppression 
hearing. Unlike the case of an absolute ban on access, therefore, 
the press here had the opportunity to inform the public of the 
details of the pretrial hearing accurately and completely” and 
the right of trial access under the First Amendment was not 
violated.53 
Besides the availability of transcripts to ensure that 
nothing untoward happens in a closed trial proceeding, courts 
might also further Sixth Amendment values by using cameras 
to take recordings, or to simulcast trial proceedings.54 Again, 
two purposes of the Sixth Amendment’s right to a public trial 
are to “ensure a fair trial” and “remind the prosecutor and judge 
of their responsibility to the accused and the importance of their 
functions.”55 Regarding the Sixth Amendment’s goal of keeping 
trial participants on their best behavior, social behavior 
 
 51. 464 U.S. 501 (1984). 
 52. Id. at 512. But see United States v. Simone, 14 F.3d 833, 842 (3d Cir. 
1994) (holding transcripts were not a sufficient grant of access). 
 53. See Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 393 (1979); In re The 
Spokesman-Review, 569 F. Supp. 2d 1095, 1102 (D. Idaho 2008) (“Her 
testimony will be forever memorialized in the written transcript, which the 
Media and public will have access to and which will be more than sufficient to 
satisfy the right of access.”). 
 54. While the author’s research has not revealed any cases concluding 
that cameras are an adequate substitute for a traditional public trial, at least 
one court has found that requiring the public to remain in an “overflow room” 
with a video feed available, rather than the courtroom itself, produced no 
actionable closure at all. See United States v. Gutierrez-Calderon, No. 
2016-0009, 2019 WL 3859753, at *11 (D.V.I. Aug. 16, 2019). 
 55. Peterson v. Williams, 85 F.3d 39, 43 (2d Cir. 1996) (citing Waller, 467 
U.S. at 46–47). 
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research indicates that, indeed, having spectators present at 
trial may serve to improve the behavior of a trial’s essential 
participants: 
[T]he presence of others may affect human experience in 
various ways: it can inhibit or facilitate public 
performances; . . . and may trigger self-evaluations and 
result in behavior adjustments. . . . In other words, the 
presence of others can be seen as a social force, affecting 
feelings, cognitions, and, to some degree, behaviors.56 
The authors of this study proposed that the “implied 
audience” provided by visible security cameras might have a 
similar effect on behavior to actual audiences examined in 
previous studies.57 And indeed, their results supported the 
hypotheses “that security cameras can trigger public helping 
behavior by implying the presence of an audience: participants 
provided more help.”58 
Although “helping behavior” may be distinguished in some 
way from the ethical choices we hope that judges and 
prosecutors will make when they are in front of an audience, 
“helping,” and, say, not asking obviously objectionable questions 
of a witness, both demonstrate pro-social impulses.59 It is 
therefore conceivable—maybe even likely—that the implied 
audience behind a camera lens will produce the same attention 
to a trial participant’s responsibilities that a live audience might 
produce. 
Another study on security camera use similarly found an 
increase in pro-social behavior when cameras were installed, 
but noted that people exposed to cameras “may become 
desensitized to the cameras over time, thus watering down the 
 
 56. Thomas J. L. van Rompay, Dorette J. Vonk & Marieke L. Fransen, 
The Eye of the Camera Effects of Security Cameras on Prosocial Behavior, 41 
ENV’T & BEHAV. 60, 61–62 (2009) (citations omitted) (reviewing previous 
research). 
 57. Id. at 64. 
 58. Id. at 68. 
 59. Id. at 69 (“Although the motivation to help may be driven by 
self-concern, that is, to ensure approval of others, cooperative behavior is 
certainly desirable in many environmental settings.”). 
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potential for long term deterrent gains.”60 One can only hope 
that the requirement of COVID closures will not persist long 
enough that trial participants reach a desensitized state. 
In the ordinary course, the right to a public trial is not fully 
realized by the availability of transcripts or the presence of 
cameras. But in this time of COVID, when courtroom closures 
are otherwise justifiable when viewed through Waller’s lens, 
these tools provide a “backstop,” a check to ensure that the 
values of the right are honored, in some degree.  
V. Conclusion 
Although the Waller test anticipates a case-by-case review 
of courtroom closure decisions, COVID closures should lend 
themselves to almost categorical approval. The strong 
governmental interest in public health is the same from case to 
case; there can be no difference in the analysis of that factor. 
Moreover, in terms of tailoring, there are few tools for a court to 
deploy in lieu of closure, partial or complete. Add to these easily 
satisfied (under these circumstances) criteria the protection of 
alternative means of making proceedings publicly available, 
and closures should not be considered the obstacle they might 
be in normal times. A court should not be required to take 
courtroom measurements—of space, of participants, of 
furniture—to determine with precision the physical distance 
between essential participants and would-be spectators. No 
math should be required of a judge—trying to both hear a trial 
and maintain safety—to determine if, just maybe, an extra 
person could have fit inside the room. It is by now a truism that 
“while the Constitution protects against invasions of individual 
rights, it is not a suicide pact.”61 
 
 
 60. Lorraine Mazerolle, David Hurley & Mitchell Chamlin, Social 
Behavior in Public Space: An Analysis of Behavioral Adaptations to CCTV, 15 
SECURITY J. 59, 72 (2002). 
 61. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 160 (1963); Terminiello 
v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 37 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (“[I]f the 
Court does not temper its doctrinaire logic with a little practical wisdom, it 
will convert the constitutional Bill of Rights into a suicide pact.”). 
